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As smartphone ownership and Internet penetration in the Philippines are among 
the highest in the world, the Philippines is well-positioned to leverage on digital 
financial services as a means of alleviating poverty. However, with the increasingly 
active implementation of the Philippine Data Privacy Act (‘DPA’), such potential 
may not be realised. The privacy regulator, the National Privacy Commission, has 
consistently set ‘notice and consent’ as the dominant mechanism for data 
processing in the delivery of digital financial services, directly replicating the 
European General Data Protection (‘GDPR’) standard.  
Such replication not only disrupts the delivery and development of digital financial 
services in developing countries, but also inherently conflicts with the use of Big 
Data for innovation. Financial inclusion may be better achieved through a test-
and-learn, industry-based approach supervised by the central bank. Further, 
regulation must be designed in proportion to the consumer risks digital financial 
services pose. 
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Technological advancements have enabled disadvantaged and low-income 
segments in developing countries to access basic financial services.1 Digital 
payment platforms, e-money, and mobile-enabled solutions are some of the digital 
financial services that deliver low-cost basic financial services in ways that 
traditional banks have been unable to.2 However, with the processing of personal 
data at the core of these technologies—from assessing credit-worthiness to 
determining insurance risks—privacy concerns inevitably arise.3 Whilst increased 
ownership of mobile devices presents an opportunity to elevate access to digital 
financial services,4 the recent implementation of the Philippine Data Privacy Act 
(DPA),5 which was influenced by the provisions of the Data Protection Directive 
and interpreted according to the provisions of the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), makes an examination of the privacy implications of digital 
financial services imperative. The task requires a delicate balance of priorities; done 
right, the delivery of such services can potentially increase the GDP of developing 
countries by as much as US$3.7 trillion by 2025, and generate as many as 95 million 
jobs, fostering economic growth and creating millions of jobs in the process.6  
 
The Philippines is a prime example of a developing country that can benefit 
from financial inclusion, which is defined by the World Bank as access to 
affordable financial products and services, delivered in a sustainable and efficient 
manner.7 The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (the Philippine central bank, or ‘BSP’) 
reports that a large segment of the Filipino adult population remains excluded from 
                                                        
1 See generally Advancing Financial Inclusion Metrics, Wᴏʀʟᴅ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Fᴏʀᴜᴍ (Jan. 2018), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_White_Paper_Advancing_Financial_Inclusion_Metrics.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/69TQ-65JM]. 
2 See generally Digital Financial Services, AFI, https://www.afi-global.org/policy-areas/digital-
financial-services (last visited Nov. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/A35P-8QK7]. 
3 See generally Satoshi Kambayashi, Big Data, Financial Services and Privacy, Tʜᴇ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪꜱᴛ 
(Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/02/09/big-data-
financial-services-and-privacy [https://perma.cc/2SWG-KSPP]. 
4 Dᴀᴠɪᴅ Lᴇᴇ Kᴜᴏ Cʜᴜᴇɴ & Rᴏʙᴇʀᴛ H. Dᴇɴɢ, Handbook of Blockchain, Digital Finance, and 
Inclusion: Chinatech, Mobile Security, and Distributed Ledger, 456 (Vol. 2, 2018). 
5 Timothy Lyman and Kate Lauer, What Is Digital Financial Inclusion and Why Does It Matter?, 
CGAP (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.cgap.org/blog/what-digital-financial-inclusion-and-why-does-
it-matter. 
6 Digital Finance Is Key to Increasing Financial Inclusion in Asia Pacific, AFI (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://www.afi-global.org/news/2017/11/digital-finance-key-increasing-financial-inclusion-asia-
pacific  [https://perma.cc/646P-NJ4K]. 
7 Digital Financial Inclusion, Wᴏʀʟᴅ Bᴀɴᴋ, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/publication/digital-financial-inclusion (last 
visited Sep. 28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/GD4A-JJ2K]. 
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the formal financial system, with only 22.6% having a formal financial account,8 
and an even fewer 11.5% having a bank account—somehow lower than the 
recorded 14.1% in 2015.9 Only 18% of Filipino adults have insurance, citing lack 
of funds, lack of need, and high cost as the major reasons for not having one.10 
Unsurprisingly, those without formal financial accounts or insurance belong to the 
poorest sectors of society.11   
 
Despite these figures, there is room for optimism: The Philippines is at the 
cusp of digital transformation in financial services. With the potential to expand 
access to basic financial services and serve as a great tool for financial inclusion,12 
digital financial services can reach millions of poor Filipinos.13 Two powerful tools 
that are essential in the delivery of digital financial services are at their disposal: 
mobile phones and access to the Internet, with 59% of the Filipinos owning a 
smartphone and Internet penetration of 55.5%, among the highest in the world.14 
Mobile phones supplement the gap in financial services that traditional banks are 
unable to address, by giving the poor access to innovative and mobile-based 
payments, savings, credit, and insurance.  
 
Such a possibility, however, may be tempered by the active implementation 
of the DPA. The National Privacy Commission (‘NPC’), the privacy regulator, has 
consistently adopted the strict European Union (‘EU’) standards of privacy, 
specifically the ‘notice and consent’ system expressed in the GDPR. As various 
financial technology (‘fintech’) services offered in the Philippines, from payment 
and lending to online wealth management and crowdfunding, are well-positioned 
to lead to financial inclusion, the DPA presents significant roadblocks that may 
irreversibly impact the delivery.15 This paper argues that the DPA, particularly its 
‘notice and consent’ regime, security measures, and stiff penalties, has a direct 
                                                        






12 See Jane K. Winn & Louis de Koker, Introduction to Mobile Money in Developing Countries: 
Financial Inclusion and Integrity Conference Special Issue, 8 Wᴀꜱʜ. J. L. Tᴇᴄʜ. & 
Aʀᴛꜱ 155, 156 (2013). 
13 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Financial Inclusion in the Philippines (2018), 
http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/Publications/2018/FIP_1Sem2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AMU3-HE3K]. 
14 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Report on the State of Financial Inclusion in the Philippines 
(2017), http://www.bsp.gov.ph/downloads/Publications/2016/Financial%20Inclusion.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SC3Q-ZT5K]. 
15 Fabian Szijarto, Digital Banking Overview in the Philippines 9, Fɪɴᴀꜱᴛʀᴀ (2017). 
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impact on the delivery of digital financial services for financial inclusion.16 This 
paper explores the extent by which the DPA’s framing of consent disrupts business 
models, stifles the use of big data, and leads to unfair competition.17    
 
Part II briefly discusses the development of privacy law in the Philippines, 
from consistently drawing from U.S. jurisprudence to an abrupt pivot to the EU-
based approach. This provides the context for the critique that follows in Part III: a 
discussion of how the DPA disrupts the democratized digital financial services as 
they are delivered, at present, prevents the use of Big Data and imposes barriers to 
entry. This Part breaks down the effectiveness of the ‘notice and consent’ system. 
Instead of asserting a privacy regime that may not be fit for purpose, Part IV closes 
with a proposal to ensure that digital financial inclusion is achieved, with the 
supervision of the BSP and with adequate privacy protections that are more 
appropriate in the context of developing countries. To be clear, this paper does not 
propose the wholesale disregard of privacy regulation, as there are perfectly valid 
reasons for requiring them. Rather, this paper suggests a bottom-up approach to 
privacy that addresses both financial inclusion and privacy regulation.  
 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVACY LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the development of privacy law 
in the Philippines from an approach that consistently drew from the U.S. legal 
system to a sudden pivot towards the EU approach with the passage of the DPA. It 
then compares the similarities between the DPA and the GDPR. Highlighting this 
sudden shift is important, considering that early digital financial services in the 
Philippines, such as Smart Money and GCash, were offered at a time when the strict 
privacy requirements of the DPA were not yet in effect. If both financial products 
were invented today, justifying them to the NPC would have been an 
insurmountable challenge.  
 
A. The Internal Tension of Privacy Law in the Philippines 
 
The diverging approaches to privacy law are influenced by a democratic 
society’s collective choice about the roles that the market, citizens, and government 
                                                        
16 See generally Aᴠɪ Gᴏʟᴅꜰᴀʀʙ & Cᴀᴛʜᴇʀɪɴᴇ Tᴜᴄᴋᴇʀ, Privacy and Innovation, 12 Iɴɴᴏᴠᴀᴛɪᴏɴ 
Pᴏʟ’ʏ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Eᴄᴏɴ. 65, 67 (Vol. 12, 2012). 
17 Douglas Randall & Jennifer Chein, 8 Key Approaches to Accelerate Financial Inclusion, 
Pʀɪᴠᴀᴛᴇ Sᴇᴄᴛᴏʀ Dᴇᴠᴇʟᴏᴘᴍᴇɴᴛ Bʟᴏɢ (Feb. 2, 2017), http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/8-key-
approaches-accelerate-financial-inclusion [https://perma.cc/JQ7R-T8CD]. 
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play.18 Liberal, market-based norms define the privacy regime in the U.S.19, 
compared to socially-protective, rights-based privacy norms in the EU.20 The EU 
model expresses privacy and data protection as rights that may be asserted against 
illegal data collection practices of firms.21 The EU frames data privacy as anchored 
in human rights, imposing on the government the obligation to ensure equal 
bargaining terms between corporations and individuals; privacy protection thus 
applies regardless of the purpose of processing.22   
 
Unlike the EU, the U.S. takes a liberal, sector-based approach to privacy.23 
Specifically, U.S. privacy law is couched as a right to personal autonomy, with 
constitutional protections against state interference, and sector-specific privacy 
legislation adopted on an ad hoc basis, based on laissez-faire economics.24 Indeed, 
the U.S. and EU approaches have been moving further apart from each other, 
following international decisions by the EU on information privacy and blockage 
of data transfers to third party nations, culminating with the passage of GDPR.25  
 
Prior to the enactment of the GDPR-like DPA, Philippine privacy law was 
largely inspired by the U.S. conceptualization of privacy. Section 2 of the Bill of 
Rights under the Philippine Constitution provides for the right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, while Section 3 emphasizes the right to privacy of 
communication and correspondence—rights that may be invoked against the 
state.26  
 
Pre-DPA privacy jurisprudence in the Philippines drew heavily from U.S. 
decisions, starting with the Philippine Supreme Court case of Morfe v. Mutuc,  
which dealt with the constitutionality of the requirement for public officers to 
disclose their assets and liabilities, on the grounds that it violates due process.27 In 
                                                        
18 Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 
Sᴛᴀɴ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1315, 1370 (2000). 
19 Id. at 1318.  
20 Id.  
21 Jᴀꜱᴍɪɴᴇ MᴄNᴇᴀʟʏ & Aɴɢᴇʟʏɴ Fʟᴏᴡᴇʀꜱ, Privacy in a Digital Networked World 203 (Sherali 
Zeadally & Mohamad Badra eds., 2015). 
22 Christopher Kuner, An International Legal Framework for Data Protection: Issues and 
Prospects, 25 Cᴏᴍᴘ. L. & Sᴇᴄ. Rᴇᴠ. 307, 1347 (2009). 
23 See Reidenberg, supra note 19, at 1342-50 (There is no omnibus privacy law in the U.S. e.g. 
privacy regulations applicable to the health sector differ from the finance sector). 
24 See id. 
25 See Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, 
126 Hᴀʀᴠ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1966, 1966-67 (2013) (discussing growing differences between the EU and 
U.S. privacy laws).  
26 Cᴏɴꜱᴛ. (1987), art. III, §§ 2-3 (Phil.). 
27 Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, 130 Phil. Rep. 415 (S.C., Jan. 31, 1968) (Phil.)  
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its ruling, the Philippine Supreme Court quoted U.S. Justice Brandeis, who 
characterized the right to be let alone as the “most comprehensive of rights and the 
right most valued by civilized men.”28 This is how the idea of various zones of 
privacy created from certain fundamental rights was imported to the Philippine 
legal system.29 In another Philippine Supreme Court case, Ople v. Torres, the  Court 
recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right guaranteed under the 
Philippine Constitution.30 In striking down the measure involved, the  Court 
admonished that a national identification system is where “[t]he end of privacy 
begins.”31 Pre-DPA privacy was traditionally asserted as a check and balance 
against the state.32 Thus, prior to the DPA, the Philippines had consistently leaned 
towards the U.S. approach to privacy law.   
 
With the passage of the DPA, the Philippines finds itself in a unique, if not 
confusing, position: the constitutional right to privacy is rooted in the laissez-faire 
U.S. concept of privacy, whilst the DPA, with provisions analogous to the GDPR, 
leans towards the opposing EU model. The DPA appears oblivious to this conflict 
and offers no solution, leaving many questions unanswered. For one, what is now 
the role of the government in upholding the right to privacy, when this right was 
traditionally asserted against it? The right to privacy has historically been asserted 
against government abuses and questionable government measures,33 which is 
more consistent with the U.S. approach. With the DPA, the government, through 
the NPC, is now expected to be the vanguard of privacy.34  
 
As an omnibus privacy law, the DPA stands as an outlier that does not 
conform to the historical development of privacy law in the Philippines. Its 
inconsistency clashes with many digital financial services that have been around 
even before the DPA, and prevents innovation that involves the processing of 
personal data, as will be argued in this paper.  With this inconsistency, justifying 
the pedestal on which the DPA appears to be placed above financial inclusion is 
difficult. There is a need to re-examine the DPA’s various provisions and its bases, 
the Data Protection Directive, and GDPR, to understand how it is a regrettable 
                                                        
28 Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).  
29 Id. at n. 63 (discussing how the U.S. concept of zones of privacy stemming from the U.S. Bill of 
Rights is analogous to extending those same protections under the Philippine Constitution). 
30 See Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, 354 Phil. Rep. 948 (S.C., July 23, 1998)(Phil.) (“the right 
to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery”). 
31 See Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, 354 Phil. Rep. 948 (S.C., July 23, 1998)(Phil.). 
32 See Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, 130 Phil. Rep. 415 (S.C., Jan. 31, 1968)(Phil.). 
33 See, e.g., id.  
34 V. Pitogo, National Gov. Agency’s Compl. on Data Privacy Act of 2012: A Case Study, Phys.: 
Conf. Ser. 1201 012021 (2019) (summarizing history of privacy laws in the Philippines). 
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obstacle to digital financial inclusion.35 This is discussed in the following sub-
section.  
 
B. DPA’s Replication of the EU Approach  
 
DPA was passed supposedly because of the lack of a data protection law 
hindered the development of the business processing outsourcing (‘BPO’) 
industry.36 The DPA mirrored several provisions of the Data Protection Directive. 
Then, the GDPR replaced the Data Protection Directive with twice as many 
provisions. One of the reasons for updating the Data Protection Directive with the 
more exhaustive GDPR is a supposed need to institute more rigid protective 
measures in light of emerging technologies, such as cloud computing, Big Data, 
and the Internet of Things (“IoT”).37 A specific concern is how consent 
requirements under the Data Protection Directive have been used by companies on 
a take-it-or-leave-it basis, where customers must consent to the service or be 
blocked from using it altogether.38  
 
With the enactment of the GDPR, the NPC has actively sought to show that 
it aligns with the DPA’s provisions. As noted by a previous Deputy Commissioner 
of the NPC, compliance with the DPA would equate to 90% compliance with the 
GDPR.39 In its newsletter, the NPC set out the similarities between the two: 
 
 
 GDPR DPA 
Consent 
Consent must be freely given, 
specific, informed, and 
unambiguous indication of the 
data subject’s agreement to the 
processing. This is indicated 
Consent must be freely given, 
specific, informed indication of 
will that the data subject agrees 
to the processing of personal 
data. This is evidenced by 
                                                        
35 See Lyman & Lauer, supra note 6 (defining digital financial inclusion as, “digital access to and 
use of formal financial services by excluded and underserved populations”). 




39 Damian Mapa, Mapping the Philippine Data Privacy Act and GDPR: A White Paper from the 
EITSC, Eᴜʀᴏᴘᴇᴀɴ Iɴɴᴏᴠᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, Tᴇᴄʜ., ᴀɴᴅ Sᴄɪ. Cᴛʀ. Fᴏᴜɴᴅ. 1 (2018), https://eitsc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Mapping-the-DPA-and-GDPR.pdf. 
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through a statement of clear 
affirmative action. 40 





Consent, necessary for the 
fulfillment of a contractual 
arrangement, compliance with a 
legal obligation, protection of 
vital interests, public of the 
processor, public 
interest/exercise of official 
authority, or legitimate 
interest.42 
For the processing of personal 
information: consent, necessary 
for the fulfillment of a 
contractual arrangement, 
compliance with a legal 
obligation of the processor, 
protection of vital interests, 
public interest/exercise of 




Controllers must implement 
appropriate technical and 
organizational measures to 
demonstrate GDPR 
compliance, and build in 
privacy by default and design.44 
They must also undertake 
compulsory data protection 
impact assessments,45 and 
appoint data protection 
officers.46 
Controllers and processors47 
must implement organizational, 
physical and technical security 
measures.48 Privacy impact 
assessments must be 
undertaken for programs or 
processes that involve the 
personal data.49 A data 
protection officer must also be 
appointed.50 
                                                        
40 Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Eᴜʀᴏᴘᴇᴀɴ Uɴɪᴏɴ, Rᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴ 2016/679 ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Eᴜʀᴏᴘᴇᴀɴ Pᴀʀʟɪᴀᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ 
Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ ᴏꜰ 27 Aᴜɢᴜꜱᴛ 2016: Gᴇɴᴇʀᴀʟ Dᴀᴛᴀ Pʀᴏᴛᴇᴄᴛɪᴏɴ Rᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴ [hereinafter GDPR]; GDPR 
art. 4(11). 
41 CONGRESS OF THE PHIL., REPUBLIC OF PHIL. Rᴇᴘ. Aᴄᴛ Nᴏ. 10173: Dᴀᴛᴀ Pʀɪᴠᴀᴄʏ Aᴄᴛ ᴏꜰ 2012 
[hereinafter DPA]; DPA § 3(b). 
42 GDPR Recital 39-52, art. 6.  
43 See DPA § 12. 
44 GDPR art. 5(2), 24, 25. 
45 Id. art. 35. 
46 Id. art. 37. 
47 DPA § 3(i) (referring a processor as "any natural or juridical person qualified to act as such 
under this Act to whom a personal information controller may outsource the processing of 
personal data pertaining to a data subject"). 
48 Id. § 20. 
49 Id. 





Administrative fines of up to 20 
million euros or 4% of annual 
worldwide turnover.51 
Fine of up to PhP 2,000,000 and 
imprisonment of up to seven 
years.52 
 
The GDPR and the DPA share many other similarities, but the above 
provisions are singled out, specifically because they are relevant in analyzing the 
impact of the DPA on the delivery of digital financial services. In fact, the DPA is 
more punitive, with the potential of imprisonment of up to seven years.53 
 
The NPC is empowered by the DPA to issue advisory opinions based on 
inquiries by the public.54 The NPC has used this power to further align itself with 
GDPR. There are a number of NPC opinions that directly affect the delivery of 
digital financial services. To start with, the NPC expressly stated that the DPA 
applies to companies in the financial sector that are engaged in processing personal 
data.55 The regulator has also expressly qualified certain standard practices in the 
financial services industry as falling within the scope of the DPA, such as mobile 
phone data shared for credit scoring,56 anonymized statistical data,57 and data 
shared between entities.58  
 
Perhaps one of the more significant interpretations of the DPA involved 
consent: the NPC has certain terms that set opt-in consent as the baseline standard 
when processing is based on consent, ruling out the possibility of using implied, 
                                                        
51 GDPR art. 83. 
52 DPA §§ 25-37. 
53 Id. § 28. 
54 Id. § 7. 
55 PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO. 
2017-23 (June 21, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wp-
content/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-023.pdf. 
56 PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO. 
2017-31 (June 28, 2017) (holding that while the DPA does not apply to truly anonymous 
information, it must prevent the possibility of identification of the data subject. As discussed in the 
next section, technological advancements puts effective anonymisation solutions at a permanent 
state of uncertainty), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wp-
content/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-031.pdf. 
57 PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO. 
2017-27 (June 23, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wp-
content/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-027.pdf.  
58 PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO. 
2017-13 (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wp-
content/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-013.pdf.  
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passive, or opt-out consent.59 In interpreting the requirement of consent, the NPC 
has on at least two occasions in to adopted the GDPR interpretation that consent 
must be a freely given, specific, informed and ambiguous—clearly indicating the 
data subject’s acceptance of the processing by the controller; silence, pre-ticked 
boxes, or inactivity do not meet this criterion.60 While controllers theoretically need 
not limit themselves to consent, as there are other criteria for processing personal 
data that may be relied upon, the NPC considers consent as the most reliable if not 
unassailable criterion. Responding to a question on whether an entity providing 
credit scores  based on mobile phone data is covered by the DPA, the NPC 
unsurprisingly answered in the affirmative, then went one step further by stating 
that the processing activity requires consent.61 Consent is likewise the criterion for 
data sharing, even among affiliates.62 Based on these opinions, the NPC has exerted 
an active effort to set ‘notice and consent’ as the ideal standard for processing.  
 
The above opinions, which frame consent as the ideal standard for data 
processing, come at a time when several studies have critiqued overreliance on 
‘notice and consent’ as a standard for data processing,63 and this, in particular, is 
examined more closely in the next section. Moreover, by expressly citing the 
GDPR, the NPC has shown its proclivity for transplanting the GDPR into the 
Philippine context as shown in Part III below. This policy direction has far-reaching 
implications on the delivery of digital financial services geared towards financial 
inclusion.   
 
III. THE IMPACT OF REPLICATED GDPR STANDARDS ON THE DELIVERY OF 
 DIGITAL FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR FINANCIAL INCLUSION  
 
                                                        
59  PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO. 
2017-23 (June 21, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wp-
content/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-023.pdf. 
60  PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO. 
2017-53 (Sep. 11, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wp-
content/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-053.pdf; PRIVACY POLICY 
OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO. 2017-42 (Aug. 14, 
2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wp-
content/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-042.pdf.  
61  PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, ADVISORY OP. NO. 
2017-31 (June 28, 2017), https://www.privacy.gov.ph/wp-
content/files/attachments/advopn/NPC_AdvisoryOpinionNo._2017-031.pdf. 
62 PRIVACY POLICY OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF PHIL. NAT’L PRIVACY COMM’N, IᴍᴘʟᴇᴍᴇɴᴛIɴɢ Rᴜʟᴇꜱ ᴀɴᴅ 
RᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛIᴏɴꜱ ᴏꜰ RᴇᴘᴜʙʟIᴄ Aᴄᴛ Nᴏ. 10173 § 20 (Aug. 24, 2016).  
63 Eugenia Politou, Efthimios Alepis & Constantinos Patsakis, Forgetting Personal Data and 
Revoking Consent under the GDPR: Challenges and Proposed Solutions, 4 J. Cʏʙᴇʀꜱᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ 20, 
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Having discussed the transplantation of the EU-based privacy regime, this 
Part discusses how the current privacy regime, specifically the system of ‘notice 
and consent’ drawn from the Data Protection Directive and interpreted in 
accordance with the GDPR, may negatively impact the delivery of digital financial 
services and may impede the common goal of financial inclusion. Innovations in 
digital financial services have been making strides towards financial inclusion by 
enabling the poor to make financial transactions, empowering them to have formal 
saving channels, and increasing their ability to partake in profit-enhancing 
activities. With the DPA, such financial services may violate the ‘notice and 
consent’ system in place, among other provisions.64   
 
This Part is divided as follows: first, it maps the link between digital 
financial inclusion and innovation in fintech. Second, it discusses the problems that 
scholars have identified with the ‘notice and consent’ system transplanted from the 
EU. The third subsection more thoroughly illustrates possible DPA violations 
inherent in the current business model of digital financial services in the 
Philippines. Such services primarily rely on branchless banking, which was legal 
in the pre-DPA privacy era. The fourth sub-section analyzes how the DPA's ‘notice 
and consent’ system prevents the use of Big Data, which is integral for the 
innovation of financial processes. The fifth sub-section discusses how the DPA 
discourages competition and, as a corollary, encourages monopolies.  
 
Innovation in digital financial services usually takes the form of fintech 
products—services that offer credit, provide financial advice, manage assets, and 
facilitate mobile money transactions.65 A key concept that ties the discussions 
below together, and is important to remember, is how innovation has helped reduce 
poverty through inexpensive and efficient financial services—enabling the poor to 
make mobile payments, gain access to savings, and increase their ability to partake 
in profit-enhancing activities—all of which seem simple but provide a crucial 
financial lifeline to the unbanked.66  
 
 A. The Dilemma of Financial Exclusion 
 
While providing access to financial services may seem like a 
straightforward process, developing countries like the Philippines have struggled 
                                                        
64 Sylviane Guillaumont Jeanneney & Kangni Kpodar, Financial Development and Poverty 
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2008). 
65 Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech (2018) 65 UCLA L. 
Rᴇᴠ. 23, 239. 
66 Jeanneney and Kpodar, supra note 65, at 19. 
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with financial inclusion for decades. The population of the Philippines is 101 
million people,67 of which 53% live in rural areas68 and 21.6% live below the 
national poverty level. Among the Filipinos who are employed, only 8.3% have the 
purchasing power of $.190 daily.69 The underserved segment is primarily 
comprised of two groups in poverty: the unbanked who do not have any relationship 
with financial institutions and the underbanked who have a basic but insufficient 
relationship with financial institutions.70 Reaching this segment of the population 
has been a Sisyphean task for banks. These groups are not only financially illiterate, 
but many live in remote areas where bank branches are financially unsustainable. 
They do not have enough money to avoid transacting through the formal banking 
system that would result in higher transaction costs than those paid by an average 
person. Even worse, they have no credit history that can help determine their 
creditworthiness for lower interest rates.71 The list of challenges goes on and 
accurately illustrates the effect of lacking access to basic necessities like a bank 
account.72 
 
The solution to reaching the underserved segment lies in innovation: first 
by breaking down the complex causes of financial exclusion to their elemental 
components, finding inventive solutions for each identified problem, and then 
testing each solution in the market for efficacy.73 In this regard, mobile phones have 
proven to be a powerful means to deliver financial services to achieve financial 
inclusion.74 With 59% of the population owning a smartphone and 55.5% using the 
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Internet,75 the Philippines could use smartphones and the Internet as a viable, 
effective, and inexpensive means for delivering financial services to the poor.76 As 
key components driving the digital financial inclusion,77 the evidence that mobile 
phones can improve access to financial services is by no means anecdotal. When 
governments cannot invest in the complex banking infrastructure and banks deem 
such investment as financially unsound, digital financial service has emerged as a 
viable alternative to include the underserved population into the financial system in 
countries that have high mobile phone penetration.78 Considering the advantages of 
digital financial services concerns about how policy decisions (in this case, the 
DPA) can affect the trajectory of fintech are well-founded.79  
 
Financial inclusion measures access to four types of financial services: 
credit, savings (including current accounts), payments, and insurance.80 There are 
many examples of fintech bridging the gap towards financial inclusion. How the 
DPA affects innovation in these four types of financial services is discussed in the 
subsequent sections. 
  
B. DPA’s Problematic Framing of Consent 
 
This section analyzes the ‘notice and consent’ standard of processing under 
the DPA, imported from the EU-based approach. As discussed in Part II, the ‘notice 
and consent’ system under the DPA, as interpreted by the NPC, copies the language 
and interpretation of the GDPR.  
 
Copying the EU-based privacy approach may be incompatible with 
innovation81, as reflected in the so-called “European Paradox”—the contrast 
between the EU’s reputable academic position vis-à-vis its relative weakness in 
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innovation.82 The Internet market illustrates the phenomenon: not only has the EU 
failed to become a leader in this field, but it also has not been noticeable.83 This 
was not always the case as EU-based companies had the first-mover advantage in 
information and communication technologies. However, the EU privacy regime 
became increasingly strict and U.S.-based Internet juggernauts like Google, 
Facebook, Amazon, and Twitter took over the market.84 In the data-driven market 
as the Internet, the EU-based model, which emphasized ‘notice and consent’ from 
its inception, may have failed to take into account that “regulation could preclude 
economic and societal benefits.”85 While factors other than privacy also led to this 
contrast, the United-States-based privacy approach facilitates the flow of 
information necessary to fuel the information economy of the Internet. The U.S. 
model is consistent with the idea that as long as consumer protection mechanisms 
and security concerns are in place, personal data is a useful tool that can promote 
innovation.86 In fact, the pre-DPA privacy law in the Philippines followed the U.S. 
model, allowing the invention of mobile money systems and e-money in an 
environment relatively unencumbered by regulation.87 
 
Upon the implementation of the DPA, consent became the preferred 
standard of processing and the dominant mechanism in some parts of the modern 
world.88 This approach, as required by the GDPR and replicated by the NPC, 
intuitively makes sense, as it empowers individuals to exercise their privacy 
rights.89 However, the ‘notice and consent’ system is replete with assumptions and 
anachronisms at the expense of financial inclusion in the long run.90 The 
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requirement of consent assumes that consumers read written privacy policies in the 
first place and therefore, can give meaningful consent.91 The truth could not be 
further removed from this assumption—the forms contain too much legalese;92 they 
are too time-consuming to read; resistance to giving consent is futile;93 or, 
electronic contracts just do not have the same compelling force as paper contracts.94 
The reality is that consumers simply do not pay attention when consenting to 
privacy policies.95 While the DPA makes an extensive enumeration of the rights of 
a data subject, as well as the risks of privacy violations, consumers simply do not 
have the expertise and information to sift through a privacy policy and make an 
informed choice.96 This is the so-called transparency paradox: even the most 
sophisticated users would be confounded by the impact of information practices 
relating to their personal data.97 Thus, the ‘notice and consent’ system forces 
individuals to make a binary choice—based on a complex number of factors they 
do not even realize or are not aware of, to begin with—regarding their privacy.98 
 
The reality of a consumer’s modern commercial life is that to avail of a 
service, there is no choice but to tick the consent box—and all other alternative 
services impose the same condition.99 Privacy has certainly not been identified as a 
reason to refuse service. Moreover, the transparency paradox has found its way to 
the Philippines, as the active implementation of the DPA has resulted in the 
ubiquity of privacy policies that need to be expressly agreed to before a service is 
provided.100 At best, the barrage of these tick boxes is an unwelcome interruption 
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to a consumer’s online life.101 At worst, it is a grim reminder that resistance is futile, 
and the consumer really has no choice but to agree.102  
 
A perspective to consider is that the consumer intuitively welcomes 
information sharing in certain cases or for a certain price.103 Indeed, if privacy is so 
important to one’s dignity, then people would not be giving away tidbits of their 
personal lives on social media or discarding it away to participate in promotional 
advertisements.104 Also, while people value privacy, they are actually willing to 
disclose sensitive information about themselves for just a small price, like a chance 
to win in a raffle contest.105 That Filipinos are on top when it comes to social media 
usage for the third year in a row—spending almost four hours a day on average—
speaks to this notion.106 Moreover, consumers may want to have their data profiled, 
so they can receive targeted information about the services they may be of 
interest.107  
 
The question of how the extensively criticized ‘notice and consent’ system 
impacts innovation, especially in financial services, is therefore important to 
consider. The attempt to frame consent as a matter of individual choice is a barrier 
to necessary research that could lead to innovation.108 ‘Notice and consent’ systems 
impede data flows,109 resulting in a restrictive environment that prevents the 
processing of personal data to experiment with innovative financial solutions. 
Experimentation would entail reverting to the individual multiple times to obtain 
their consent—a task too costly to undertake, and is therefore unlikely to be allowed 
by firms.110 The DPA’s ‘notice and consent’ system has been interpreted by the 
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NPC so rigidly (in that it can only be opt-in)111 and at the same time so broadly (in 
that it can apply to all situations that remotely have a data processing component)112 
that what should be a peripheral concern turns into a major red flag for financial 
innovation.113 With its power to prosecute for imprisonment and sanction standard 
financial services industry practices through its opinions,114 the NPC is generating 
false positives: characterizing present and future business models as in breach of 
the ‘notice and consent’ system, when, as discussed in this subsection, this standard 
is problematic in the first place. Moreover, certain industry practices, which were 
in place pre-DPA, are normatively acceptable, at least in the Philippines.115  
 
A study commissioned by the NPC showed that 94% of Filipino adults want 
to understand how their personal data is used in transactions and that 85% believe 
that the rights of data subjects are important.116 This should not give the privacy 
regulator the blanket authority to impose ‘notice and consent’ as the ideal standard 
for processing. Instead, it should provide the impetus for the NPC to conduct 
information awareness campaigns. A more reasoned approach, which is discussed 
in more detail in Part IV below, is for the NPC to adopt an innovation-friendly 
stance, protecting core privacy values and recognizing its role in the delivery of 
digital financial services.117 For a country that is only beginning to understand 
privacy regulation, this seems more plausible than the current activist stand of the 
NPC in its bid to set “higher bars for compliance standards in the Asia-Pacific 
region.”118  
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C. DPA Disrupting Current Business Models 
 
The story of digital financial inclusion in developing countries commonly 
begins with mobile payments.119 In no other area has fintech played a greater role 
in promoting financial inclusion than in the area of mobile payments.120 The ‘fuel’ 
of mobile payments systems is mobile money—electronic money that allows users 
to store, send, and receive money in a mobile phone-based account.121  
 
If a mobile phone is a powerful tool for the underserved to gain access to 
financial services, retail agents serve as the infrastructure for facilitating this 
access.122 Filling the gap left by the lack of brick-and-mortar banks, retail agents 
serve as the communication points for customers to use their mobile phones to store 
e-money, to make money transfers, and to withdraw cash from their mobile-based 
account.123 This is known as branchless banking, the reliance on non-bank outlets 
such as retail stores, grocery shops, lottery outlets, gas stations, and fertilizer stores, 
instead of brick-and-mortar banks, to provide financial services.124 Under this 
model, the agent (who is often the cashier of the store) performs the traditional 
banking role by settling transactions with the customer.125 Through these low-cost 
delivery channels, underserved people can reliably access financial services, 
increasing financial inclusion,126 with little delay,127 and minimal transaction 
costs.128 Kenya’s M-Pesa, widely considered one of the most successful case 
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studies for mobile payments, has a ratio of 48.46 active agents per 10,000 adults129 
and over 12 million users since its 2007 launch.130 
 
The Philippines is the pioneer in mobile payments, with the launch of Smart 
Money in 2001131 and GCash in 2004.132 Operated by the two telecommunications 
(‘telco’) operators in the Philippines, their services allow subscribers to facilitate 
money remittances, pay bills, and avail of products and services via SMS. In the 
Philippines, these services are commonplace in sari-sari stores: small 
neighborhood retail shops that sell basic commodities such as instant noodles, 
canned food, and candy chips.133 These stores serve as access points for senders to 
transact, deposit and withdraw money with their mobile accounts.134 Mobile money 
may even be used to pay for sari-sari store goods.135 As a country with over 7,500 
islands, bank branches present in only 50% of these islands, and 36% of 
municipalities without a bank branch, the value that branchless banking brings is 
significant.136 
 
A vibrant mobile payments market is just an entry point for providing other 
financial services crucial to financial inclusion: savings, credit, and insurance.137 
Aside from enabling money transfers digitally, mobile payments serve as a reliable 
way of saving cash, albeit without earning interest.138 As for credit, mobile payment 
systems serve as viable channels for making loan payments.139 A subscriber’s data 
history can also serve as a way of building data history that potential lenders can 
use to assess credit risk.140 Mobile microfinance, which allows smartphone users to 
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borrow money after an evaluation of their mobile phone data (from their call usage 
to their bill payments),141 promises better accountability, lower transaction costs, 
flexibility, and transparency.142 With mobile microfinance, the underserved are 
given the opportunity to engage in entrepreneurial activity.143 Several credit-related 
initiatives have already been introduced in the Philippines: Lenddo for non-
conventional credit scoring, GoodKredit for disbursing short-term consumer loans, 
Loansolutions.ph as a P2P lending marketplace,144 and Lendr as a loans 
management platform.145 Lastly, for insurance, mobile payment systems can serve 
as a channel for providing insurance. This is possible through partnerships between 
telco operators that serve as customer-facing distribution channels and commercial 
insurers who remain risk carriers. Together, they enter into outsourcing 
arrangements, where practically all but underwriting risks are outsourced to the 
telco operators.146 The last metric of financial inclusion, insurance, is particularly 
important for the poor, who face major risks, yet are unfortunately the least likely 
to buy insurance products.147 For example, weather risk is a major problem farmers 
face, and index-based weather insurance, with payouts triggered upon certain 
weather measurements, allows them to take on risks with their farming choices that 
result in better yield.148 
 
Quite unsurprisingly, data processing is involved in facilitating mobile 
payment systems, and delivering savings, credit, and insurance to the underserved.  
Mobile payment systems work because consumers only need to comply with 
rudimentary identification requirements when going to a sari-sari store. The DPA 
turns this approach on its head by requiring consent to be in written form, evidenced 
through electronic or recorded means.149 If the DPA were applied as intended, opt-
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in consent would apply to every transaction. Quite simply, the DPA attempts to fix 
a system that is not broken and that has worked for the poor in far-flung and 
poverty-stricken areas in developing countries for several years now. Not only 
would the DPA’s new requirement be impractical, but it would also unnecessarily 
complicate an otherwise straightforward and painless transaction between the retail 
agent and the subscriber. The consequences are grave, as violations may lead to 
hefty penalties and even imprisonment. The problem that the DPA tries to address 
by embedding a ‘notice and consent’ mechanism in such a transaction is not clear: 
in the Philippines, there has so far been no identified risks or reported privacy 
violations arising from mobile payments transactions of this kind.   
 
Moreover, the cost of complying with the GDPR is estimated to be 
US$50,000 for small businesses with less than nine employees.150 Considering the 
similarities between the GDPR and the DPA, this is money that sari-sari stores 
simply do not have. For a simple store selling basic commodities with little more 
than a few hundred dollars of gross earnings in a month, the requirements the DPA 
impose are not only burdensome but also risky considering the penalties under the 
DPA.  
 
Another characteristic of the financial services industry is the use of data as 
a currency for providing customized benefits and personalized products.151  The 
value of processing personal data in delivering such financial services to the poor 
is apparent. By using Big Data and artificial intelligence, financial providers can 
arrive at superior and more reliable data to assess the actual credit-worthiness of an 
individual,152 reducing information asymmetry that has made it hard for traditional 
lenders to provide similar services to the underserved.153 Investors, lenders, and 
financial institutions use these technologies, generating relevant datasets after being 
fed vast amounts of raw data, to provide credit at a lower cost and in a more 
accessible manner.154 The free flow of information is necessary to assess credit risk, 
to deliver mobile microfinance, and to establish insurance partnerships. 
Partnerships that allow service providers to share datasets among themselves, to 
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come up with fresh insights, are integral to financial inclusion.155 Many datasets 
necessary for delivering digital financial services involve linking various datasets 
to find new insights.156 The ‘notice and consent’ system would require renewed 
consent every time information systems are activated to deliver digital financial 
services—an impractical and costly requirement that will significantly drive up 
their costs and result in unreasonable delay.157  
 
D. DPA Stopping Big Data in its Tracks 
 
Referring to the use of increasingly sophisticated algorithms to aggregate 
and classify otherwise unobservable patterns, trends, and behaviors of individuals 
or consumer segments,158 Big Data can arrive at highly complex datasets filtered 
from various sources, including a person’s cookies, social networking activities, 
online transactions, mobile phone usage, and email exchanges.159 Big Data is made 
more powerful by modern devices, such as wearables and smart appliances, that 
actively process personal data and communicate them to a service provider—the 
so-called IoT.  
 
Interoperability, a characteristic of big data that entails the sharing of 
datasets of personal information among service providers,160 is a key element in 
extending digital financial services to the poor.161 Such datasets may be obtained 
from data on a user’s mobile device, call and text history, use of value-added 
services, Internet usage, and financial transaction data.162 With this resource 
businesses can create a more accurate profile of their consumers, allowing them to 
identify consumer needs and deliver more relevant financial products and 
services163  with better pricing options.164 Moreover, partnerships among providers 
are more easily formed as common needs and goals are identified.165 Big Data 
likewise allows firms to engage in targeted marketing, the use of processed data to 
deliver advertisements that match consumers’ needs and interests.166 Recommender 
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systems, which offer custom recommendations based on previous purchasing 
decisions, are another by-product.167 All these result in lower operating costs for 
the service provider that may lead to low-cost services for the underserved168 and 
more useful information for consumers tailored to their interests.169 
 
This is the modern world we live in. Current data collection practices are a 
complex ecosystem of various players—from profilers and advertising agencies to 
advertisement purchasers and websites that post advertisements. These players 
simultaneously retain, analyze, and distribute personal data in various, 
unpredictable ways. A single processor simply cannot predict or describe in 
sufficient detail how specific data is being utilized.170 In the context of Big Data, 
the value of personal data is not immediately apparent at the point of collection.171 
Insights that may lead to innovation are realized only after datasets are combined, 
tested, or used in the market, in an open environment.172 Calling this interlocking 
system abusive is an oversimplification, as it has enabled commercialism and 
financial inclusion,173 leading to many innovations in the digital economy.174   
 
Big Data is a game-changer for financial inclusion. Several mobile financial 
applications are underpinned by interoperable identity management systems.175 An 
example is M-Pesa. From its use as a mobile payments system, M-Pesa utilized its 
massive datasets of personal data, partnered with financial institutions, and 
expanded into offering accessible and cost-efficient savings and credit for the 
poor.176 Big Data also makes possible the creation of niche financial products that 
would otherwise be too risky to put out in the market,177 like providing emergency 
funds where other fund sources are unavailable.178 To democratize access to 
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credit,179 a person’s transaction history, mobile wallet use, and subscriber tenure 
can be used to assess creditworthiness, especially for people who have no credit 
history with a bank.180 Known as algorithmic lending 2.0, firms are increasingly 
turning to expanded volumes of data and machine learning to analyze data, then 
feeding the results into credit-scoring algorithms, to arrive at a more accurate risk 
profile of a person.181 The same footprints can also be used to offer them insurance 
products with custom features and modified payment schemes.182  
  
The realities of Big Data are incompatible with the ‘notice and consent’ 
system of the DPA, as the use of personal data cannot be readily ascertained and 
only becomes apparent after novel connections among datasets are made, in an 
environment of open creativity.183 This is the same environment in which 
algorithmic lending is deemed permissible. Thus, obtaining informed consent at the 
time of collection (where it is usually given) is simply antithetical to the open-ended 
nature of Big Data.184 Where the DPA errs is in its assumption that data controllers 
process tidbits of personal data at a time, when the reality of Big Data is that 
multiple processors, and combined datasets from various sources, are involved at 
any given point in time.185 The DPA discounts the fact that processors cannot, in 
principle, obtain informed consent because Big Data assumes that raw data is in 
itself meaningless and purposeless until combined with other datasets, analyzed for 
its significance, and then used to come up with creatively designed digital financial 
services.186 In this complex ecosystem, there is no clear processor, and the datasets 
are not located in a single repository at any given time.187 Privacy harms, when they 
do happen, are an effect of aggregation of personal data over time by various 
entities, and pinning the blame on a single entity is erroneous.188 The IoT involves 
an overlap of interconnected devices and systems collecting and processing 
personal data in a continuous loop, therefore, applying the DPA means that consent 
would have to be obtained ceaselessly as well.  
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E. DPA’s Anticompetitive Effect 
 
This sub-section discusses the link between privacy regulation and 
competition in financial services.189 The recent enactment of the Philippine 
Competition Act190 highlights the government policy to promote unencumbered 
market competition in the interest of consumers, encourage an entrepreneurial 
spirit, facilitate technology development, and enhance resource productivity.191  
 
Companies engaged in data-intensive operations thrive because of economies of 
scale and network effects.192 In the Philippines, the most popular digital financial 
services are operated by duopolistic telco operators. While one may superficially 
conclude that the DPA decreases the tendencies of monopolization by curbing data-
mining practices, the opposite rings true. The DPA actually encourages 
monopolies, to the exclusion of resource-strapped smaller players.193  
 
The DPA applies to the data processing activities of a processor, regardless 
of its size and scale. Both dominant financial service providers and startups have to 
comply with the DPA. This is a costly undertaking that requires organizations, 
among other things, to invest in IT systems, conduct audits, hire data protection 
specialists, seek extensive legal advice, amend and renegotiate contracts, and 
undertake technical and organizational measures.194 Small Philippine startups 
already lack capital, meaning that any privacy-related costs, if by the company, will 
likely be passed on to the consumer. 
 
This uniform treatment results in a disproportionate and unlevelled playing 
field. Established financial service providers are more capable of persuading 
consumers to give up consent, simply because they have more to offer than 
SMEs.195 Consumers are likely to trust entrenched brands and continue using their 
services, instead of new entrants who have not proven their value.196 This will allow 
dominant players to maintain their position in the market, as they continue to collect 
and process personal data with relatively few roadblocks. With access to their 
consumer data, established service providers can afford investing in behavioral 
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targeting techniques that avoid the application of the DPA,197 while SMEs do not 
have the same resources to invest in equally expensive techniques. SMEs can only 
rely on accessible personal data (that the DPA now prohibits) to provide innovative 
financial services. Because consumer data is not as easily accessible for SMEs, they 
cannot understand consumer behavior as well as the bigger players can,198 resulting 
in additional barriers to entry and ineffective financial services. New Zealand is an 
illustrative example: its strict credit card reporting regime resulted in only a few 
banks being able to issue credit cards as the prohibitive costs and restrictive 
requirements prevented smaller firms from engaging in data-related activities as 
simple as running credit card checks on applicants.199   
 
To bring the example closer to the Philippines, the two leading mobile 
payment services providers, Smart Money and GCash, dominate the mobile 
payments market and are provided by the only two telco operators in the 
telecommunications industry.200 With only 1.3% of the Filipino population having 
an electronic money account201 and  although the Philippines pioneered the digital 
payments industry, the DPA will only further entrench these dominant players in 
the industry. They will not only have access to customer data, but also the resources 
needed to target consumers, invest in behavioral targeting techniques, and comply 
with the burdensome requirements of the DPA. Because the DPA imposes equally 
strict requirements on both dominant players and new entrants and exposes them to 
unreasonable risks, SMEs have to consider all these costs, aside from their main 




IV. A VIABLE PROPOSITION TO PRIVACY REGULATION OF FINANCIAL 
 SERVICES 
 
The Philippine central bank has declared financial inclusion as one of its 
goals, recognizing how sustainable, secure, and affordable financial services can be 
delivered in a digital finance ecosystem.202  In its report, the BSP has identified 
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three pillars to achieve this: (1) a retail payment system that allows even small-
value transactions, (2) a network of affordable touchpoints for clients to be onboard 
users, and (3) convenient access to an account that will allow the poor to open and 
use digital financial services.203 As shown in Parts III(C) and (D), digital financial 
services can provide support for these three pillars. Also, a recent conference in the 
Philippines showcased the various local fintech initiatives that can potentially drive 
financial inclusion across the country.204 The central bank has thus far demonstrated 
the right attitude, with an understanding of how digital financial inclusion can lead 
to economic empowerment and poverty reduction.205 As argued in this paper, the 
NPC’s consent framework may derail the possible gains in digital financial 
inclusion. 
 
This Part discusses an approach that will support the trajectory of innovation 
for financial inclusion, without disregarding the importance of privacy. By framing 
privacy risks as a consumer protection issue, actual privacy problems relating to 
transparency and fair treatment are addressed. 
 
A. Maintaining the Test-and-Learn, Industry-Based Approach to  
  Financial Regulation 
 
The ladder to the success of financial innovation that leads to financial 
inclusion is not prudential and proactive regulation, but a regulatory policy that 
enables service providers to engage in prudent behavior.206 Thus far, the ideal 
regulatory formula for digital financial inclusion is for regulators to maintain a 
healthy distance and to work closely with service providers, to develop custom-fit 
regulations consistent with international standards.207 Service providers must be 
given enough legroom to experiment and fine-tune their digital financial services—
regulatory intervention should only be introduced as flagged issues start to 
materialize and risks (including privacy-related ones) become clear.208 
 
The BSP has believed in this approach since the start. When telco operators 
in the Philippines started offering their mobile payment services, the BSP agreed to 
accord them the status of a remittance agent, instead of a deposit-taker, substantially 
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lessening their need to comply with burdensome banking regulations.209 Later, the 
BSP issued its e-money regulation,210 notable for ensuring that the playing field 
between banks and nonbanks are equal.211 Intending to promote financial inclusion, 
the regulation arose from the BSP’s test-and-learn approach.212  
 
To complement this approach, the regulator should emphasize and foster 
multi-sectoral cooperation. Dominant players, telco operators, startups, investors, 
and retail agents must be given adequate representation and a forum to ensure that 
digital financial inclusion is achieved whilst addressing actual data privacy risks, 
and not imagined ones.213 This will foster an environment that facilitates open 
dialogue on the best data processing practices for digital financial inclusion, instead 
of the tendency towards strict privacy rules, like DPA, that require controllers to 
comply with privacy rules on paper without truly understanding the essence of 
privacy protection.214 Moreover, an open environment will force industry players, 
including the NPC, to reexamine the ‘notice and consent’ system. 
 
Entities engaged in data processing themselves recognize that they are in 
the best position to standardize data protection practices and to balance privacy with 
the free flow of information necessary for innovation.215 By giving the financial 
services market the responsibility of setting professional standards and ethical 
market conduct concerning privacy, the end product is a privacy framework that is 
fit for its purpose,216 and does not rely on ‘notice and consent’ as a mere formality 
and a way of abrogating responsibility.217 A culture of institutional accountability 
is thus created.218 To be clear, the BSP’s powers are not diminished; it merely gives 
the market the flexibility and accountability it needs to develop viable financial 
solutions.219  
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This proposed liberalized approach marks a return to form. As previously 
discussed in Part II(A) of this paper, the Philippines had consistently followed the 
market-based, sector-specific approach to privacy, until suddenly pivoting to the 
EU-based model.  If the DPA was enacted because the lack of a data privacy law 
might hinder the growth of the outsourcing sector,220 perhaps the Philippine 
legislature should have enacted a BPO sector-specific privacy legislation instead, 
consistent with the US approach.   Moreover, a market-based approach would give 
the market the leg room it needs to rectify recurring privacy-related problems. 
Identity theft, for example, can be minimized by biometric technologies such as 
facial recognition technology.221 Privacy-Enhancing Technologies, such as 
encryption techniques and certain data analytic and management tools, were 
engineered by the private sector well before the GDPR—and are continuously 
improving, regardless of what the privacy law may require.222 Better algorithms are 
being designed to prevent algorithmic discrimination.223 These just show that, even 
without strict privacy regulation, the industry is aware of the commercial 
importance of privacy. 
 
B. Going Back to Basics by Generating Privacy Awareness 
 
Whilst financial inclusion is important, this does not mean that privacy is 
not important for the underserved.224 Big Data can be used for price discrimination 
and identity theft.225 Digital financial services may be used to commit financial 
crimes, like money laundering and terrorist financing.226  
 
The solution to privacy violations is not a ‘notice and consent’ regime. As 
discussed in this paper, it forces individuals to make a responsible choice,227 
without achieving its purported goal of protecting information privacy.228 Instead, 
this paper advocates for a bottom-up approach. Before providing sweeping 
regulation that can affect how entire industries operate, it makes sense to generate 
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more public awareness about privacy issues and the benefits and risks of the 
processing of their personal data.229  
 
While unappealing and rudimentary, the solution necessitates going back to 
basics—first, by increasing public awareness of privacy issues.230  General 
awareness campaigns must be conducted with a twofold purpose: to promote digital 
financial literacy and to uphold transparency concerning the relevance of data 
processing in the delivery of digital financial services.231 Equipping Filipinos with 
digital financial literacy will not only give them access to crucial financial services, 
but it will also give them a concrete picture of how their personal data is used.232 A 
campaign that highlights both digital financial services and the privacy concerns 
they pose will address the goals of financial inclusion, without dismissing the data 
privacy angle.233 The net result is financially literate Filipinos who have a 
meaningful understanding of how their Internet behavior and mobile phone usage, 
interacts with privacy.  
 
Transparency in data processing practices, instead of ‘notice and consent’, 
must be the key focus in disseminating awareness. Transparency regarding the 
various processors in the information-sharing ecosystem and the lawful uses of 
personal data is a more reasonable obligation to impose on financial providers at 
this point, than the burdensome compliance costs of ‘notice and consent’.234 Only 
after genuinely providing the foundation for privacy awareness can a credible 
sector-specific privacy regulation that balances financial inclusion and privacy 
concerns be in place. 
 
 
C. Reframing Privacy as a Consumer Protection Issue 
 
While generating privacy awareness is important, the question of where 
privacy fits in the regulation of digital financial services remains unanswered. In 
this regard, this article proposes that privacy must be approached as a matter of 
consumer regulation.235  Regulation can be designed in proportion to the risks posed 
to a consumer of digital financial services.236Applying regulations as proportionate 
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measures compared to the risks requires the private sector and regulators to 
collaborate and research to arrive at a common understanding of how digital 
financial services interact with consumers.237 This may require more 
experimentation and processing of personal data—which a ‘notice and consent’ 
regime does not endorse.  
 
In framing privacy as a consumer protection issue, the question needs to be 
asked: to what extent should privacy violations be considered consumer protection 
violations?238 What consumers arguably need most in the delivery of financial 
services is transparency, fair treatment, and effective dispute resolution 
mechanisms—factors that privacy regulation purports to regulate, but in reality, are 
within the domain of consumer protection.239 For instance, data processing 
activities that result in racial profiling or discrimination based on one’s marital 
status or gender should be considered violations of consumer protection standards. 
Under this mindset, the likely solution is the mitigation of possible privacy harms 
to an individual,240 reserving the need for consent only in appropriate and limited 
occasions where consumers will actually pay attention to them.241 
 
Considering the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the digital economy, 
it makes more sense to require organizations to institute a relatively flexible 
framework of privacy principles emphasizing the responsible and transparent use 
of personal data rather than imposing a costly and rigid ‘notice and consent’ system 
that may impede innovation without achieving its purpose.242 This is what Google 
suggests in the Framework for Responsible Data Protection Regulation the 
company released in September to guide the United States Congress.243 While 
Google’s self-interest is apparent, its recommendation complements the test-and-




As the U.S. and the EU continue to disagree about their approaches to 
privacy, the NPC has put the Philippines in a precarious situation, innovation-
wise, by taking a clear side and dictating absolutist outcomes. This brings to mind 
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one of the problems with the implementation of the Single Euro Payment Area 
(‘SEPA’):  
 
No cost-benefit study was undertaken before the SEPA 
project was launched but it appears that both regulators and banks 
grossly underestimated its costs. The problem of unexpectedly 
difficult and expensive technological problems was compounded by 
EU regulators’ notion that a pan-European electronic fund transfer 
network constituted a public good, which made it easy for them to 
reject any obligation to ensure there was any way for the banks to 
defray the cost of creating it. Thus, the cost of modifying their 
legacy systems and business practices to accommodate the SEPA 
system fell squarely on the banks.244 
 
A similar predicament exists in the Philippines in the sense that when the 
NPC interpreted the DPA by importing the GDPR’s ‘notice and consent’ regime in 
the delivery of financial services, it did not appear to have considered the difficult 
and expensive technological problems such an interpretation would pose to the 
delivery of digital financial services. An important difference, however, is that the 
NPC does not—and can not—proscribe financial services providers from defraying 
the costs of privacy compliance by transferring them to the consumer, who will 
likely have to pay more for digital services in the end. 
 
This paper has shown how the DPA, with its GDPR-like standard of ‘notice 
and consent’ not only disrupts the delivery of digital financial services in 
developing countries like the Philippines but also inherently conflicts with the use 
of Big Data for innovation that may lead to financial inclusion. It also has an 
anticompetitive effect by placing costly barriers to entry for SMEs that might 
compete with leading digital financial services providers.  
 
To achieve digital financial inclusion, the increasing reliance of the NPC on 
‘notice and consent’ as the gatekeeper of data privacy must be dismissed in favor 
of a test-and-learn, industry-based approach supervised by the BSP. This does not 
mean dismissing privacy concerns altogether, as digital financial inclusion and 
privacy regulation need not clash with each other. Rather, the industry must take 
the lead in developing standardized data practices that balance privacy protection 
and the free flows of information, ultimately creating a culture of accountability. 
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Privacy awareness must be generated to supplement the need for digital financial 
literacy and transparency in data processing. Privacy concerns must then be 
approached as a consumer protection issue so that regulation can be designed in 
proportion to the consumer risks digital financial services pose.  
 
With the high percentage of smartphone ownership and the suite of digital 
financial services offered in the market, digital financial inclusion in the Philippines 
is within reach. It cannot afford a setback in the form of a restrictive and ill-fitted 
‘notice and consent’ system under DPA. As the NPC has the power to impose 
prohibitive penalties and even prosecute violations as crimes punishable by 
imprisonment, the ‘notice and consent’ system must be challenged now, and 
replaced with a more flexible and relevant privacy regulation that works towards, 
and not against, financial inclusion.   
